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It is widely assumed that laws governing dairy production 
include substantial protection of animals’ interests—that in some 
way the state is regulating the treatment of farmed animals and 
protecting them against the worst excesses of their owners’ self-
interest.  In fact, across jurisdictions in Canada and the United States, 
the standards governing farmed animal protection are not established 
by elected lawmakers or appointed regulators, but are instead 
primarily defined by private, interested parties, including producers 
themselves.  As scholars of animal law have noted, this has 
contributed to weak and ineffectual legal protection of the interests 
of farmed animals.  The present study will focus on a distinct, though 
related, difficulty arising from the de facto or de jure delegation of 
standard-setting authority to animal industries.  Not only does this 
delegation result in less stringent standards, but it also works to erode 
crucial public law values, such as transparency, accountability and 
impartiality.   
This limitation of public law values poses a deep structural 
threat to animal interests, especially in light of animals’ particular 
dependence on public law for their protection.  Animals are excluded 
from private law protections, and from direct access to conventional 
means of legal and political participation, leaving them without legal 
avenues to press their interests as individuals.  Effective animal 
protection therefore requires that the human beings who advocate for 
animal interests have meaningful access to standard-setting 
processes.  Such meaningful access is facilitated where public law 
values assure transparent, accountable and impartial decision-
making.  For this reason, the assignment of standard-setting authority 
to private producers, and the attendant diminution of public law 
values, is of special concern in the animal protection context.  This 
 
* Jessica Eisen is an Assistant Professor at the University of Alberta Faculty of 
Law.  The author extends her sincerest thanks to her co-editors on this volume, 
Erum Sattar and Xiaoqian Hu, for their energy and enthusiasm throughout this 
project, and for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.  Thanks 
are owed also to the University of Alberta’s Kule Institute for Advanced Studies 
and to the University of Arizona for supporting an extremely helpful workshop in 
connection with this volume.  The author is grateful to all the participants in that 
workshop and, in particular, the discussants Albertina Antognini and Andrew 
Woods for sharing their reactions to an earlier draft. 
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article will chart the operation of private power in setting standards 
for the protection of dairy cattle and identify the damage this 
privatized authority does to public law values. The article will 
tentatively suggest in conclusion that high levels of privatization in 
standard-setting may reflect a public desire to be comforted by the 
idea of regulation, tempered by an underlying ambivalence 
respecting the practical consequences of meaningful legal oversight. 
I.  Introduction 
At the heart of the Canadian and US dairy industries are 
cows: millions of living, feeling creatures, whose lives are shaped, 
from birth to death, by our collective decision to use their bodies in 
food production.  It is widely assumed that laws governing dairy 
production include substantial protection of these animals’ 
interests—that in some way the state is regulating the treatment of 
farmed animals and protecting them against the worst excesses of 
their owners’ self-interest.1  In fact, across jurisdictions in Canada 
and the United States, the standards governing farmed animal 
protection are not elaborated by elected lawmakers or appointed 
regulators, but are instead primarily defined by private, interested 
parties, including producers themselves. 
As scholars of animal law have noted, this has contributed to 
weak and ineffectual legal protection of the interests of farmed 
animals.2  The present study will focus on a distinct, though related, 
difficulty arising from the de facto or de jure delegation of standard-
setting authority to animal industries.  Not only does this delegation 
result in less stringent standards, but it also works to erode crucial 
public law values, such as transparency, accountability and 
impartiality.  This limitation of public law values poses a deep 
structural threat to animal interests, especially in light of animals’ 
particular dependence on public law for their protection.  Animals 
are excluded from private law protections, and from direct access to 
conventional means of legal and political participation, leaving them 
without legal avenues to press their interests as individuals.  Effective 
animal protection therefore requires that the human beings who 
advocate for animal interests have meaningful access to standard-
setting processes.  Such meaningful access is facilitated where public 
 
1 David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Henhouse: Animals, 
Agribusiness, and the Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, 205, 206, 226 (Cass R. Sunstein & 
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (describing a widespread “presumption that the 
law currently provides some basic legal protection for animals, even if there is 
skepticism about its effectiveness or enforcement”). 
2 See id. 
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law values assure transparent, accountable and impartial decision-
making.  For this reason, the assignment of standard-setting authority 
to private producers, and the attendant diminution of public law 
values, is of special concern in the animal protection context. 
This article will offer a descriptive account of farmed animal 
protection regimes across Canada and the United States, with a 
particular focus on dairy cattle.  The article will further advance a 
normative critique of privatized standard-setting in this sphere given 
animals’ particular vulnerabilities.  Part II will describe the 
regulatory context under consideration: the lives and well-being of 
dairy cattle in Canada and the United States.  Part III will confront 
the complexity of the supposed public/private distinction in law, 
drawing on scholarship in feminist legal theory and comparative 
administrative law.  Despite the instability of these categories, 
however, this Part will argue that the identification of public and 
private authority—and the related operation (or not) of public law 
values—remains salient in the animal protection context.  In 
particular, animals’ exclusion from private law protections and from 
formal access to legal and political institutions make public law and 
public law values (including transparency, impartiality and 
accountability) critical to effective animal protection. 
With this framework in place, Part IV will offer a description 
of regulatory approaches to dairy cattle protection in the United 
States and Canada, with an emphasis on the role of private actors in 
legal standard-setting in these jurisdictions.  This Part will reveal 
that, although a variety of regulatory mechanisms exist across 
jurisdictions, private standard-setting is commonly employed, 
supplanting crucial public law functions and values.  The Conclusion 
will reflect on why, despite the significance of public law values to 
animal protection, private power over legal standard-setting persists.  
Tentatively, this Conclusion will suggest that the present legal 
landscape may reflect a public desire to be comforted by the idea of 
regulation, tempered by an underlying ambivalence respecting the 
practical consequences of meaningful legal oversight. 
II.  Milk and the Lives of Dairy Cattle 
The lives of cows in the Canadian and U.S. dairy industries 
are controlled by human beings, from their broadest contours to their 
most minute details.3  The choices of cows themselves—respecting 
whether and how to care for their young, when and with whom to 
 
3 Jessica Eisen, Milked: Nature, Necessity, and American Law, 34 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 71, 106–109 (2019). 
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have sex, and how to live in community with their herds—are highly 
constrained.4  Their bodies are surgically altered, physically 
restrained, and continually manipulated to facilitate the production 
and extraction of their nursing materials.5  The human actors whose 
decisions so thoroughly shape these animals’ lives range from the 
farmers who own these cows as a matter of private law to participants 
in the dense networks of public administration that govern the 
production and sale of dairy products. 
The calves of dairy cows are generally separated from their 
mothers immediately after birth.6  Male calves are usually auctioned 
to be slaughtered for veal.7  Female calves spend their early days 
isolated in individual hutches, then spend a period in group housing, 
before they are old enough for their first insemination.8  Many cows 
are subject to painful physical modifications designed to support 
their use in dairying.  These include the “disbudding” or removal of 
horns to reduce the risk of injury arising from their confinement in 
close proximity;9 the cutting of “supernumerary” or inconveniently 
 
4 Id.  Animals, of course, retain their agency in the face of human constraints, 
resisting coercion and refusing instructions.  See Jason C. Hribal, Animals, Agency, 
and Class: Writing the History of Animals from Below, 14 HUM. ECOLOGY 
REV. 101, 103 (2007) (observing that “[f]aking ignorance, rejection of commands  
. . . foot-dragging . . . breaking equipment” and other tactics constitute forms of 
resistance employed by animals against human beings); Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Of Mice and Men: A Feminist Fragment on Animal Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 263, 270 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., 2004) (“Do animals dissent from human hegemony? I think they 
often do. They vote with their feet by running away. They bite back, scream in 
alarm, withhold affection, approach warily, fly and swim off.”); cf. JOCELYNE 
PORCHER, THE ETHICS OF ANIMAL LABOUR: A COLLABORATIVE UTOPIA 116 (2017) 
(explaining that cattle apply their “affective and cognitive capacities to work” in 
order to “collaborate” in certain milking processes).   
5 Eisen, supra note 3, at 106–109. 
6 Kathrin Wagner, Daniel Seitner, Kerstin Barth, Rupert Palme, Andreas Futschik 
& Susanne Waiblinger, Effects of Mother versus Artificial Rearing During the 
First 12 Weeks of Life on Challenge Responses of Dairy Cows, 164 APPLIED 
ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 1, 2 (2015).  
7 Kathryn Gillespie, Sexualized Violence and the Gendered Commodification of the 
Animal Body in Pacific Northwest US Dairy Production, 21 GENDER, PLACE & 
CULTURE 1321, 1327 (2014). 
8 Eisen, supra note 3, at 107. 
9 See Erin Mintline, Mairi Stewart, Andrea Rogers, Neil Cox, Gwyneth Verkerk, 
Joseph Stookey, James Webster & Cassandra Tucker, Play Behavior as an 
Indicator of Animal Welfare: Disbudding in Dairy Calves, 144 APPLIED ANIMAL 
BEHAV. SCI. 22, 23 (2013). 
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placed teats;10 and the “docking” or amputation of their tails to 
improve cleanliness and access to their udders.11 
To stimulate milk production, dairy cows are repeatedly 
impregnated, almost always through artificial insemination.12  When 
their calves are born, they are taken away immediately to be raised 
for dairy or veal according to their sex.13  While lactating, many cows 
are held in “tie-stall” housing systems, in which they are closely 
chained at the neck in individual stalls just large enough to allow 
them to lie down or stand up.14  A feeding trough runs in front of the 
cows, and a waste trough runs behind them.15  Such tie-stall housing 
is often supported by the use of “electric trainers” that hover over the 
cows and administer a shock if they move their bodies into positions 
that might allow them to defecate outside the designated trough.16  
When no longer considered productive, dairy cows are slaughtered, 
often after being transported many hours by truck without access to 
water or rest on their journey.17  Dairy cows are generally slaughtered 
between 4-6 years of age, well below their life expectancy (if not 
slaughtered) of 15-20 years.18 
Cows are intelligent, social animals, and there is strong 
evidence that many of these practices cause serious physical and 
emotional harm.  It is widely agreed, for example, that separation of 
these mammals from their young is a source of “distress” or “stress” 
 
10 ROGER W. BLOWEY & A. DAVID WEAVER, COLOR ATLAS OF DISEASES AND 
DISORDERS OF CATTLE 203 (3rd ed. 2011) (explaining that supernumerary teats “are 
unsightly, may interfere with milking, and can develop mastitis” and so are 
“normally removed with curved scissors early in life”). 
11 See Literature Review on the Welfare Implications of Tail Docking of 
Cattle, AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N (Aug. 2014), 
https://www.avma.org/resources-tools/literature-reviews/welfare-implications-tail-
docking-cattle; Tail Docking of Dairy Cattle: Position Statement, CAN. 
VETERINARY MED. ASS’N (Oct. 12, 2016), 
https://www.canadianveterinarians.net/documents/tail-docking-of-dairy-cattle; 
W. K. Fulwider, T. Grandin, B. E. Rollin, T. E. Engle, N. L. Dalsted & W. D. 
Lamm, Survey of Dairy Management Practices on One Hundred Thirteen North 
Central and Northeastern United States Dairies, 91 J. DAIRY SCI. 1686, 1688 
(2008). 
12 Eisen, supra note 3, at 107. 
13 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
14 Eisen, supra note 3, at 108. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 109. 
17 See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 208; Curb the Cruelty: Canada’s Farm 
Animal Transport System in Need of Repair, WORLD SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF ANIMALS 4 (2010), https://www.animalalliance.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/report-WSPA-Curb-the-Cruelty-Report.pdf. 
18 Eisen, supra note 3, at 109. 
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(to use the parlance of dairy science) for both cow and calf. 19  Indeed, 
a significant body of literature has emerged to address how the 
precise timing and manner of separation might improve productivity 
and animal well-being, since cow-calf separation often causes weight 
loss and injury as the pair attempt to reunite.20  There is also extensive 
evidence demonstrating that tail docking is painful for cows, and that 
the practice provokes behaviors associated with discomfort or severe 
pain.21  (The amputation or “docking” of cows tails is most 
commonly achieved by placing a tight band or rubber ring near the 
base of the cow’s tail, with the tail ultimately atrophying from lack 
of blood flow, then falling off.22) The practice of routine tail docking 
is officially opposed by both the Canadian Veterinary Medical 
Association23 and the American Veterinary Medical Association.24   
There are sharp differences in opinion as to the morality of 
confining, impregnating and milking animals, and as to the 
acceptability of many of the specific animal use practices within the 
dairy sector.25  Questions about the justice or fairness of laws 
protecting animals in agricultural contexts often, perhaps inevitably, 
lead to underlying questions about the importance or necessity of 
 
19 See, e.g., Frances C. Flower & Daniel M. Weary, The Effects of Early 
Separation on the Dairy Cow and Calf, 12 ANIMAL WELFARE 339, 340 (2003) 
[hereinafter Flower & Weary, Early Separation]; Frances C. Flower & Daniel M. 
Weary, Effects of Early Separation on the Dairy Cow and Calf: 2. Separation at 1 
Day and 2 Weeks after Birth, 70 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 275, 276 (2001) 
[hereinafter Flower & Weary, Separation at 1 Day and 2 Weeks]; E.O. Price, J. E. 
Harris, R. E. Borgward, M. L. Sween & J. M. Connor, Fenceline Contact of Beef 
Calves with Their Dams at Weaning Reduces the Negative Effects of Separation on 
Behavior and Growth Rate, 81 J. ANIMAL SCI. 116, 121 (2003); Wagner et al., 
supra note 6, at 2. 
20 See, e.g., Flower & Weary, Early Separation, supra note 19, passim; Flower & 
Weary, Separation at 1 Day and 2 Weeks, supra note 19, at 282–83; Price, supra 
note 19, at 121; Wagner et al., supra note 6, at 2.  
21 See M.A. Sutherland & C.B. Tucker, The Long and Short of It: A Review of Tail 
Docking in Farm Animals, 135 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 179, 187–89 (2011); 
S.D. Eicher, H.W. Cheng, A.D. Sorrells & M.M. Shutz, Short Communication: 
Behavioral and Physiological Indicators of Sensitivity or Chronic Pain Following 
Tail Docking, 89 J. DAIRY SCI. 3047, 3047 (2006); S.D. Eicher & J.W. Dailey, 
Indicators of Acute Pain and Fly Avoidance Behaviors in Holstein Calves 
Following Tail-docking, 85 J. DAIRY SCI. 2850, 2850 (2002). 
22 See AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, supra, note 11; CAN. VETERINARY 
MED. ASS’N, supra note 11. 
23 CAN. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, supra note 11. 
24 AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, supra, note 11. 
25 See Jessica Eisen, Xiaoqian Hu & Erum Sattar, Dairy Tales: Global Portraits of 
Milk and Law, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2020). 
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animal products in human diets and food systems.26  The analysis that 
follows will not endeavor to answer underlying questions as to 
whether or how the farming of mammals for their nursing materials 
might be humanely or ethically conducted.  Instead, the aim is to 
explain how different regulatory regimes have answered questions 
respecting animal care as a matter of law—and how these regimes 
have decided who decides.  In particular, this study will demonstrate 
that significant decisions respecting the permissible treatment of 
animals are often left to the private choices of individual producers.  
As the following Part will argue, high levels of regulatory 
privatization, and the resulting marginalization of public law values, 
represent serious obstacles to effective farmed animal protection. 
III.  Animals and Public Law 
Private dairy producers currently enjoy significant authority 
to set standards for farmed animal care.27 This Part will argue that 
such privatization of regulatory authority is of special concern in the 
sphere of farmed animal protection.  Because farmed animals lack 
both private law rights and direct access to formal legal and political 
remedies, their meaningful protection requires that the humans who 
advocate for animal interests have adequate access to standard-
setting processes.  This access is best supported where decision-
making is shaped by public law values such as accountability, 
transparency and impartiality. 
A. Defining Public and Private Law 
It bears mention at the outset that distinctions between public 
and private are rarely clean and never unproblematic—as scholars of 
both administrative law and feminist legal theory have long warned.  
In schematic terms, public law describes the legal relationship 
between state and citizen, while private law denotes legal relations 
between individuals.  According to this schematic, the public sphere 
is defined by shared commitments and values, while the private 
 
26 See Katie Sykes, Rethinking the Application of Canadian Criminal Law to 
Factory Farming, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMALS AND THE LAW 33, 55–
56 (Peter Sankoff, Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes eds., 2015) (observing that 
“opening up the question of what is ‘unnecessary’ in the context of food 
production could be a discomfiting prospect, since it unavoidably leads to 
questions about whether the use of animals for food is necessary at all”); Elaine L. 
Hughes & Christine Meyer, Animal Welfare Law in Canada and Europe, 6 
ANIMAL L. 23, 56 (2000) (“A clear definition of necessity would require a social 
consensus on the legitimacy and importance of various human uses of animals; 
however, this is lacking.”). 
27 See infra Part IV. 
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sphere is characterized by pursuit of self-interest.28  Within both 
administrative law and feminist scholarships, the terms public and 
private are deeply contested, subject to multiple (sometimes 
conflicting) definitions, and, in practice, impossibly intertwined. 
Within administrative law scholarship, the conventional 
public/private division is increasingly understood to be complicated 
or collapsed by the privatization of public authority, especially 
respecting standard-setting.29  The fraying edges of the public and 
private spheres identified in administrative law scholarship echo a 
related destabilization of these categories identified by feminist legal 
theorists.30  In particular, feminist theory has exposed supposedly 
“private” spheres, including “the home” and “sexuality,” as being, in 
fact, fundamentally constituted by collective commitments and 
public power.31 
For both feminist theorists and administrative law scholars, 
the complex interplay between the supposedly public and private 
aspects of law are matters of normative concern.  Feminist theorists 
have emphasized that the rhetorical delineation of certain “private” 
spheres has allowed governments to ignore, shirk or deny 
“responsibility” for certain harms or inequalities.32  In a similar vein, 
administrative lawyers have identified the operation of private power 
 
28 See Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6, 8–10 
(1988). 
29 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Linseth, and Blake Emerson, COMPARATIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Linseth & Blake 
Emerson eds., 2d ed. 2017) (noting that, although “[t]he distinction between public 
and private is . . . essential to administrative law,” the assumption that “one can 
compartmentalize regulatory activities and actors into either a public or a private 
sphere” fails to capture “the increasingly blurred boundary between state and 
society” in practice). 
30 See Derek McKee, The Public/Private Distinction in Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 55 
MCGILL L.J. 461, 472 (2010) (linking the public/private distinction within 
administrative law to the state/market divide of classical liberalism, and to related 
distinctions between market/family and civilization/state). 
31 See, e.g., Carol Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Divide, in 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 281–307 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 
1983); Susan B. Boyd, Can Law Challenge the Public/Private Divide? Women, 
Work and Family, 15 WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUST. 161, 171–74 (1996). 
32 Nicola Lacey, Theory into Practice? Pornography and the Public/Private 
Dichotomy, 20 J.L. & SOCIETY 93, 97 (1993) (asserting that the public/private 
distinction “allows government to clean its hands of any responsibility for the state 
of the ‘private’ world”); see also Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A 
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1502 (1983) 
(describing the casting of relations of “domination” as “private matters that do not 
implicate the political state”). 
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in public administration as a possible threat to public law values such 
as transparency, democracy, accountability and fairness.33   
These analyses point to a common set of underlying 
concerns.  First, the conceptual delineation of private spaces within 
legal regimes—even, or perhaps especially, when cloaked in the 
language of freedom or liberty—may in fact operate to authorize 
oppressive and even violent relationships in practice.34  Second, there 
are harms and power dynamics for which governed societies rightly 
accept shared responsibility, and our institutions should be organized 
accordingly.35  In other words, it is not simply that it is difficult or 
impossible to sort the public from the private, but rather that efforts 
to cast these spheres as independent often work to conceal and distort 
our collective obligations to one another. 
The concern that public/private legal distinctions can be 
deployed to obscure and confuse law’s role in shaping practices and 
relationships is apparent in the field of farmed animal protection.  
Elsewhere, I have suggested that the farm is analogous to the private 
sphere of the family within feminist theory—a space in which a 
particular, contestable conception of the public good is pursued using 
legal forms and social discourses that often reject overt public 
regulation in favor of such values as privacy, personal duty, and even 
love.36  The present analysis details farmed animal protection 
regimes in Canada and the United States to reveal the mechanics of 
 
33 See, e.g., Jean-Bernard Auby, Contracting Out and “Public Values”: A 
Theoretical and Comparative Approach, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
552, 552 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Linseth & Blake Emerson eds., 2d ed. 
2017) (describing the question of how to maintain private contractors’ adherence 
to “public values” as a “characteristically post-modern administrative law 
question”).   
34 See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY 
OF SELF, AUTONOMY AND LAW (2011) (offering an extended argument in favor of 
legal analyses that focus on the relationships produced by legal rules). 
35 C.f. Lacey, supra note 32, at 97. 
36 See Eisen, supra note 3, at 98-101 (2019) (discussing “the farm” as analogous to 
the “private sphere” of feminist theory); Jessica Eisen, Milk and Meaning: Puzzles 
in Posthumanist Method, in MAKING MILK: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF 
OUR PRIMARY FOOD 237, 240 (Mathilde Cohen & Yoriko Otomo eds., 2017) 
(observing that regulation of the farm, like “the family” within feminist critique, 
“trusts private actors (farmers; husbands) to wield their power appropriately 
because they are well-intentioned, bound by duty, and even because they love 
those in their charge”); see also Dinesh Wadiwel, Whipping to Win: Measured 
Violence, Delegated Sovereignty and the Privatised Domination of Non-Human 
Life, in LAW AND THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL: A CRITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 116, 
116–32 (Yoriko Otomo & Edward Mussawir eds., 2013) (describing the 
“privatised domination of non-human life”); Mathilde Cohen, Of Milk and the 
Constitution, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 115, 152 n.238 (2017) (analogizing the 
private sphere of the farm to the private sphere of the family). 
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the public/private law interplay working to keep the treatment of 
farmed animals effectively unregulated by public authorities.  
B. Animals and Public Law Values 
Despite the identified artificiality of distinctions between 
public and private in legal ordering, the analysis that follows will rely 
on these terms to some extent.  This is because, although 
problematic, these categories remain operative, with their operation 
having significant consequences for farmed animal protection.  There 
are two critical aspects of animal protection regimes that demand 
continued attention to distinctions between public and private law in 
this context.  The first is the reality that so-called private law (laws 
understood to govern relations between individuals) have 
consistently refused to recognize animals as the kinds of individuals 
whose relations are of legal consequence.  The second is that values 
such as transparency, accountability and impartiality are legally 
cognizable only with respect to public law authority.  Because these 
public law values are crucial to effective animal protection, the 
juridical positioning of animal protection as a matter of public law 
improves prospects for animal protection. 
Animals do not hold private legal rights, even to their own 
lives and bodies.  Instead, private law has quite durably retained a 
basic classification of animals as things: mere objects of the property 
rights of others.37  In terms of private law alone, animals are objects, 
not subjects.  They are things to be owned, traded, and extinguished 
at the will of those who hold rights to their bodies.  In the famous 
formulation of property as relations amongst people (rather than 
relations between people and objects),38 relations with animals are 
 
37 See GARY FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY AND THE LAW 65–115 (1995); 
Wendy Adams, Human Subjects and Animal Objects: Animals as “Other” in Law, 
in 3 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 29, 29–30 (2009).  In recent years, a number of civil 
law jurisdictions have formally affirmed in their civil codes that animals are not 
“things”; however, each of these jurisdictions has also specified that provisions 
pertaining to “things” also apply to animals, making the change in status merely 
nominal.  See Sabine Brels, The Evolution of the Legal Status of Animals: From 
Things to Sentient Beings, THE CONSCIOUS LAWYER (Jan. 2016), 
https://www.theconsciouslawyer.co.uk/the-evolution-of-the-legal-status-of-
animals-from-things-to-sentient-beings/. 
38 See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, 
THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 3–4 (1994); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE 
L.J. 16, 22–23 (1913).  
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invisible, with no real meaning in the world of legal value and 
exchange.39 
Public law, on the other hand, has long recognized some 
minimal legal significance in animals’ own lives and experiences, 
most notably through prohibitions against cruelty and the regulation 
of certain animal-use industries.  Admittedly, the longest-standing 
forms of public law protection of animal interests—criminal 
prohibitions of cruelty and bestiality—have not focused on animal 
well-being as much as they have attended to human property interests 
or community morals.40  In both Canada and the United States, 
however, there is evidence of a shift in emphasis in public and 
judicial understandings of these laws: a growing sense that their 
purpose is, at least in part, to protect animals for their own sakes.41  
The treatment of animals has become the subject of regulatory 
concern, with human use of animal property addressed as a site of 
ongoing risk and oversight.42  These regulatory interventions now 
commonly reference the interests of animals as being legally 
relevant.43 
In addition to providing the sole available forum for pressing 
animals’ interests, public law is tied to values of particular 
significance for effective animal protection—namely transparency, 
 
39 Some have claimed that being “owned” may be beneficial to animals.  See, e.g., 
Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 143, 148–149 (Cass R. Sunstein & 
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (arguing that “[b]ecause they use and value 
animals, owners will spend resources for their protection,” such that “[o]ver broad 
areas of human endeavour, the ownership of animals has worked to their 
advantage”).  Of course, any indirect benefit that animals may experience to the 
extent that they hold value to their human owners does not amount to private law 
recognition of animals’ interests.  Moreover, in the case of farmed animals, 
especially in industrial-scale agricultural operations, relations of economic 
exploitation diminish the likelihood of alignment between animal and owner 
interests.  See Ani B. Satz, Animals as Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond Interest-
Convergence, Hierarchy, and Property, 16 ANIMAL L. 65, 79–80 (2009). 
40 See Margit Livingston, Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the Law’s Role 
in Prevention, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1, 21–29 (2001) (noting that, in the United States, 
19th century anti-cruelty laws were generally interpreted by courts “under the 
rubric of property” or as emphasizing that “cruelty was degrading to the human 
perpetrator, the human witnesses, and society as a whole”).  
41 See, e.g., Regina v. D.L.W., [2016] 1 S.C.R. 402, para. 140; see also Jessica 
Eisen, Animals in the Constitutional State, 15 ICON: INT’L J. CONST. L. 909, 911–
923 (2018) (offering a broader cross-jurisdictional account of legal attention to 
animal interests). 
42 See, e.g., The Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131. 
43 See, e.g., id. at § 2131(1). 
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impartiality and accountability.44  Because animals lack access to 
human language, they are especially vulnerable to having their 
interests overlooked in legal and political processes as they are 
currently structured.45  The traditional democratic mechanisms 
through which state power is held to account—elections and 
litigation—are not directly available to animals to contest inadequate 
or unfair conduct.46  Elsewhere, I have argued that animals therefore 
experience “radical vulnerability” within contemporary legal 
systems: they are both subject to ongoing state-sanctioned harm, and 
practically excluded from both law-making and rights-
enforcement.47   
Because animals are not legally empowered to press the 
private dimensions of their own individual interests,48 the public 
character of animal protection demands heightened acknowledgment 
and institutional fortification.  Effective protection of animal 
interests depends on animal advocates having meaningful access to 
processes that assure the sufficiency and implementation of 
standards.  In public law terms, this requires that standard-setting 
 
44 See Michael Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law Determined?, in THE 
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 3–4 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) 
(summarizing that “[t]he list of public law values includes openness, fairness, 
participation, impartiality, accountability, honesty and rationality”). 
45 Eisen, supra note 41, at 941–42.  Some scholars have argued that this structural 
exclusion of animals from political and legal decision-making can and should be 
reformed.  See, e.g., SUE DONALDSON & WILL KYMLICKA, ZOOPOLIS: A POLITICAL 
THEORY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 255 (2011) (calling for recognition of “animals not 
just as individual subjects entitled to respect of their basic rights, but as members 
of communities—both ours and theirs—woven together in relations of 
interdependency, mutuality and responsibility”); Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson, 
Animals and the Frontiers of Citizenship, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 207 
(2014); Alasdair Cochrane, SHOULD ANIMALS HAVE POLITICAL RIGHTS? 90–91 
(2020); Robert Garner, Animals, Politics and Democracy, in THE POLITICAL TURN 
IN ANIMAL ETHICS 103, 115 (Robert Garner & Siobhan O’Sullivan eds., 2016). 
46 See Eisen, supra note 41, at 925–29. 
47 Id. at 941-946.  For other scholarly treatments of animal “vulnerability,” see, 
e.g., Maneesha Deckha, Vulnerability, Equality, and Animals, 27 CANADIAN 
J. WOMEN & L. 47 (2015); Satz, supra note 39. 
48 Scholars have debated whether legal standing for animals should be either 
acknowledged or expanded as a means of allowing animals, through their 
representatives, to enforce legal interests or rights.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1333 
(2000); Kelsey Kobil, When it Comes to Standing, Two Legs are Better than Four, 
120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 621 (2016).  Even if such standing were recognized, 
however, the legal rights and interests in question would (absent dramatic 
transformation of animals’ legal status) remain public law protections.  Moreover, 
the effective advancement and enforcement of legal standards by animals’ 
representatives would continue to require transparent, impartial and accountable 
institutions. 
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authority be entrusted to institutions that value impartiality, 
accountability, and transparency.49 
The first of these principles, impartiality, represents a core 
public law value relevant to animal protection law.  Impartiality 
requires that decision-makers not decide matters in their own self-
interest, a principle rooted in the idea that “a judge should neither 
judge her own cause nor have any interest in the outcome of a case 
before her (nemo judex in sua causa debet esse).”50  Impartiality has 
been a particularly fraught moral and legal concept, particularly 
insofar as it might seem to imply the possibility of a “view from 
nowhere,” concealing the standpoint of privileged speakers in the 
process.51  In the case of animal protection, we might think it 
impossible to find a truly impartial or disinterested human decision-
maker, given the widespread human consumption of animal 
products.52  But a narrower conception of impartiality—foreclosing 
decision-making by those with a direct financial stake in the 
outcome—is also at stake in dairy governance. To the extent that 
dairy producers have economic incentives to intensify dairy 
operations in ways that prioritize efficiency over animal well-being, 
the value of impartiality weighs against granting them the authority 
to set standards of animal care.53 
 
49 See Jessica Eisen, Beyond Rights and Welfare: Democracy, Dialogue, and the 
Animal Welfare Act, 51 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 469, 481–485 (2018). See generally 
Eisen, supra note 41.   
50 Laverne A. Jacobs, Tribunal Independence and Impartiality: Rethinking the 
Theory after Bell and Ocean Port Hotel—A Call for Empirical Analysis, in 
DIALOGUE BETWEEN COURTS AND TRIBUNALS—ESSAYS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND JUSTICE (2001–2007) 43, 47–48 (Laverne A. Jacobs & Justice Anne L. 
Mactavish eds., 2008).  Jacobs further notes the connection between impartiality 
and “the notion that decision-making requires a decision-maker to hear and listen 
to both sides of the case before making a decision (audi alteram partem).”  Id.  
Some have distinguished “impartiality” from “independence,” with “impartiality” 
representing a “state of mind” and “independence” invoking the institutional forms 
that assure impartiality.  R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 at para. 15; see also 
Gillies v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 All E.R. 731 at para. 
38 (Baroness Hale).  In this article, I take “impartiality” to embrace both the 
personal and institutional dimensions. 
51 See Kathryn Murphy and Anita Traninger, Introduction: Instances of 
Impartiality, in THE EMERGENCE OF IMPARTIALITY 1, 5–6, 20 (Kathryn Murphy & 
Anita Traninger eds., 2013). 
52 See Matthew Liebman, Who the Judge Ate for Breakfast: On the Limits of 
Creativity in Animal Law and the Redeeming Power of Powerlessness, 18 ANIMAL 
L. 133 (2011). 
53 See Eisen, supra note 41, at 950 (“Human efforts to determine the legal and 
regulatory strategies that best advance the interests of animals are plagued by 
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The second of these values, accountability, connotes “legal 
oversight of public power.”54  While accountability might embrace a 
broad array of values and institutions, I mean here to invoke a 
relatively narrow meaning: that public actors might be called upon to 
justify their decisions, that their justifications may be subject to 
review, and that there may be consequences for failed justification.55  
The principle that exercises of public power must be held to account 
is essential to democracy and the rule of law.56  It is also critical to 
animal protection.  To the extent that animal protection depends upon 
the oversight of human advocates for animal interests, those human 
advocates must have access to legal mechanisms by which to 
challenge decisions respecting standards of animal use and care.  
Transparency is a third public law value that is critical for 
both animal protection and democratic governance more broadly.57  
Transparency refers to the ability of “external stakeholders to 
monitor the internal workings of an organization.”58  While 
transparency may have costs and “trade-offs” in terms of efficiency 
and other values, it is generally accepted that “at very low levels of 
transparency, more transparency is likely to be beneficial” for good 
governance.59  With respect to animal protection, transparency 
 
conflicts of interest, and these conflicts are exacerbated when enforcement 
agencies lack independence from the industries they regulate.”). 
54 CRAIG FORCESE, ADAM DODEK, PHILIP BRYDEN, RICHARD HAIGH, MARY LISTON 
& CONSTANCE MACINTOSH, PUBLIC LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND ANALYSIS 12 
(4th ed., 2020).  Such “legal oversight” (for example, by judges and administrative 
tribunals) is distinguishable from “political oversight” (achieved, for example, 
through periodic elections).  Id. at 10–14. See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas 
Schillemans eds., 2014) (offering an introduction to scholarship on accountability 
as a legal and political value). 
55 Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual 
Framework, 13 EURO. L.J. 447 (2007) (setting out the definition of accountability 
on which I rely here).  
56 Forcese et al., supra note 54, at 10.  See also Mark E. Warren, Accountability 
and Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 39 
(Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas Schillemans eds., 2014). 
57 See Anoeska Buijze, The Six Faces of Transparency, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 3, 5 
(2013).   
58 Scott Douglas & Albert Meijer, Transparency and Public Value—Analyzing the 
Transparency Practices and Value Creation of Public Utilities, 39 INT’L J. PUB. 
ADMIN. 940, 940 (2016). 
59 David Heald, Transparency as an Instrumental Value, in TRANSPARENCY: THE 
KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 59, 59 (Christopher Hood & David Heald eds., 
2006); see also Paul Daly, Administrative Law: A Values-based Approach, in 
PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION IN COMMON LAW SYSTEMS: PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE 
23 (John Bell, Mark Elliott, Jason N.E. Varuhas & Philip Murray eds., 2016) 
(identifying transparency as “an important legal value”). 
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(respecting both the conditions of animals’ lives and the processes 
by which those conditions are regulated) is necessary to minimize 
the risk of political erasure arising from animals’ exclusion from 
traditional modes of legal engagement.60  Because animals cannot 
advocate for themselves under current legal arrangements, human 
advocates for animal interests must have some minimal access to 
information in order to hold decision-makers accountable and assure 
adequate substantive protection.61 
Commitments to impartiality, transparency, and 
accountability thus take on a special significance in the animal 
protection context.  These values, however, are generally only 
cognizable as legal commitments where public authority is 
recognized as operative.62  Yet, despite the practical significance of 
public law values to effective animal protection, regulatory regimes 
in Canada and the United States often depend on privatized standard-
setting, concealing public responsibility and minimizing or erasing 
the application of public law values. 
IV.  The Public and the Private In Dairy Governance 
Across Canada and the United States, a variety of regulatory 
regimes govern the protection of farmed animals.  This Part offers a 
survey of these governance approaches, organized according to a 
rough spectrum of legal forms, ranging from the most public (i.e., 
primary legislation) to the most private (i.e., unencumbered 
individual producer choice).  As this survey will demonstrate, 
however, this neat organizational structure belies the messy interplay 
between public and private authority that in fact characterizes this 
 
60 See Eisen, supra note 41, at 951; Eisen, supra note 49. 
61 See Albert Meijer, Transparency, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 507 (Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas Schillemans 
eds., 2014) (examining the relationship between transparency and accountability). 
62 It is, of course, possible for private parties to bind themselves to such principles 
through private contractual obligations.  The U.S. National Dairy FARM program 
and the Dairy Farmers of Canada ProAction Initiative are examples of this form of 
commitment respecting dairy cattle welfare.  See Katelyn E. Mills, Katherine E. 
Koralesky, Daniel M. Weary & Marina A. G. von Keyserlingk, Dairy Farmer 
Advising in Relation to the Development of Standard Operating Procedures, 103 J. 
DAIRY SCI. 11524, 11524 (2020).  Such mechanisms have become matters of 
increasing interest in the fields of international and comparative administrative 
law.  See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 
YALE L.J. 383 (2006).  This article has focused on standard-setting with a 
connection, however tenuous, to generalized legal requirements.  The role of 
voluntary or contractual standard-setting by commodity producer associations 
represents a distinct but equally fascinating case study into agricultural industry 
self-regulation. 
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field of law.  On closer examination, it becomes apparent that even 
the most ostensibly public forms of governance are structured to give 
substantial standard-setting power to animal use industries.  This 
privatization of governing authority comes at the expense of public 
law values that are required for effective animal protection.  
Various legal forms are employed to confer standard-setting 
authority on dairy producers.  In some jurisdictions, this is achieved 
through judicial or statutory deference to the aggregate choices of 
individual producers, expressed as affirmative permission to engage 
in “customary farming practices.”63  In other jurisdictions, private 
bodies comprised largely of producers and their representatives are 
directly or indirectly empowered to set standards for permissible 
conduct.  The following subsections will detail these various 
regulatory forms.  The final subsection of this Part will summarize 
the substantial role that private parties play across these animal 
protection regimes, and the threat that this privatized governance 
poses to public law values such as transparency, impartiality and 
accountability. 
A.  Primary Legislation 
One governance tool employed to protect farmed animals is 
primary legislation.  Farmed animal protection laws are passed either 
through ordinary legislative processes (i.e., by elected 
representatives) or through direct popular referenda in states where 
such lawmaking processes exist.64  Respecting primary legislation, 
the connection to public law values and processes is, in principle, 
relatively clear: legislators are broadly accountable to the electorate 
(not just to any single interest group), and their laws and legislative 
processes are relatively transparent by constitutional design.65  Yet, 
as we will see, legislative provisions protecting farmed animals often 
grant significant de facto or de jure authority to private actors to 
determine the substance of the standards imposed. 
 
63 Wolfson & Sullivan supra note 1, at 212. 
64 See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR ANIMALS ON FARMS 
(2018) at 8–11. 
65 Of course, in practice, these values are often not well safeguarded.  As public 
choice theorists, in particular, have elaborated, legislative processes are often not 
public, transparent or impartial at all.  See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice Theory 
and Legal Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOL. 
1: METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTS (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017).  Nonetheless, the 
basic institutions of democratic governance are present, and legislation is among 
the most undeniably public forms of standard-setting. 
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Legislation restricting specific animal use practices on farms 
are exceedingly rare in Canada and the United States.66  Respecting 
dairy cattle, these are limited to legislative prohibitions on routine 
tail docking in California67 and Rhode Island.68  In all other US states, 
and in Canada, the use of primary legislation to protect animals on 
farms is limited to broadly framed provisions, for example 
prohibiting “cruelty” or the causing of “distress” (collectively 
referred to here as “anti-cruelty statutes”).69  In Canada, these include 
both federal criminal prohibitions on cruelty toward animals70 and 
provincial quasi-criminal cruelty prohibitions.71  In the United States, 
 
66 See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 3, 8–11. Note that the 
present analysis is restricted to the legal treatment of animals on farms.  More 
detailed legislative and regulatory constraints apply with respect to transport and 
slaughter in both jurisdictions.  In Canada, see Health of Animals Act, S.C. 1990, 
c 21 and Health of Animals Regulations, C.R.C., c 296 (regarding transport); Safe 
Food for Canadians Act, S.C. 2012, c 24 and Safe Food for Canadians Regulation, 
S.O.R./2018-108 (regarding slaughter).  In the United States, see Twenty-Eight 
Hour Law, 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (1994) (regarding transport); Humane Methods of 
Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (1958) and Humane Slaughter of 
Livestock Regulations, 9 C.F.R. 313 (1987) (regarding slaughter).  For 
commentary on these regimes, see Vaughan Black, Traffic Tickets on the Last 
Ride, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMALS AND THE LAW 57, 57–68, 73–79 
(Peter Sankoff, Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes eds., 2015); Sophie Gaillard & 
Peter Sankoff, Bringing Animal Abusers to Justice Independently: Private 
Prosecutions and the Enforcement of Canadian Animal Protection Legislation, in 
CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMALS AND THE LAW 307, 313–14 (Peter Sankoff, 
Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes eds., 2015) (arguing that private prosecutions might 
also be brought under these statutes); Wolfson & Sullivan supra note 1, at 207–
209. 
67  CAL. PENAL CODE § 597n (West 2010). 
68 4 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 4-1-6.1 (West 2012). In addition, there are some 
legislated protections respecting the tethering and confinement of calves, though 
this more commonly impacts the related veal industry. See generally ANIMAL 
WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 9, 11. 
69 See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 2; LESLI BISGOULD, ANIMALS 
AND THE LAW 57–123 (2011).  As discussed above, both jurisdictions include 
further regulatory oversight once animals have left the farm, during transport and 
slaughter. See supra note 66.  
70 In Canada, criminal law is the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.  
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 91(27).  The Criminal Code of 
Canada sets out a number of offences respecting the treatment of animals, 
including a general prohibition against causing unnecessary pain, suffering or 
injury to an animal.  Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 445.1(a). 
71 Provincial governments in Canada are authorized to make law in respect of 
property and civil rights.  Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 92(14). 
Provincial authority to govern the treatment of animals is generally grounded in 
this power, as animals are legally classified as property.  For a survey and 
discussion of Canadian provincial anti-cruelty laws, see BISGOULD, supra note 69, 
at 97-123. 
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these take the form of state-level criminal anti-cruelty laws.72  These 
general anti-cruelty statutes are often structured to exempt common 
agricultural practices from their purview—an exemption that has 
given industry actors a central role in defining the substance of the 
governing legal standards. 
In Canada, the classic case establishing the exemption of 
common agricultural practices from criminal cruelty prohibitions is 
Pacific Meat.73  In that case, the British Columbia County Court was 
called upon to construe a federal Criminal Code provision making it 
a criminal offence to “wilfully cause[] or, being the owner, wilfully 
permit[] to be caused unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an 
animal or bird.”74  At issue in that case was whether a method of 
slaughtering pigs—in which conscious pigs were hoisted by the leg, 
slammed into a wall and then stuck with a knife—caused pain, 
suffering or injury that was “unnecessary” and so prohibited by the 
criminal law.75  The court held that, while this conduct might 
constitute criminal cruelty outside the slaughterhouse context, in the 
present case there was no “unnecessary” suffering given the 
“necessity of slaughtering hogs to provide food for mankind.”76  
Although the Crown adduced evidence of less-painful slaughter 
methods, the court was not prepared to accept that this made the 
method at issue “unnecessary.”77  In particular, the court was 
persuaded by the fact that all other slaughter houses in Canada, and 
several U.S. slaughterhouses employed this same method.78 
 
72 See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 208–09.  In the United States, criminal 
law is generally determined at the state level, rather than by the federal 
government. 
73 Regina v. Pacific Meat Co., [1957] B.C.J. No. 98, para. 14 (B.C. Cty. Ct.). 
74 Criminal Code of Canada, 1953-54, c 51, § 387(1)(a).  That provision has since 
been replaced by the identically phrased Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c 
C-46, § 445.1(a). 
75 See Pacific Meat, [1957] B.C.J. at para. 1–4. 
76 Id. at para. 14. 
77 Id. 
78 Id at para. 10.  The court, on the evidence, was not prepared to find that these 
alternative methods were, in fact, less painful.  Id.  Nonetheless, the case has come 
to stand for the proposition that courts ought to defer to common industry practice 
in defining the scope of the criminal prohibition at issue.  See Sykes, supra note 
26, at 33, 38 (explaining that “an interpretation of the animal cruelty offence has  
. . . become entrenched whereby almost anything done to animals as part of the 
business of producing animal food is exempt from the Code’s application,” though 
disputing the doctrinal basis for this interpretation); see BISGOULD, supra note 69, 
at 71 (explaining that prevailing interpretations of the Criminal Code include a “de 
facto exemption” for farmed animals). 
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Since Pacific Meat, the Criminal Code has not generally 
been applied in prosecutions of agricultural operations.79  Instead, 
prosecutions for cruelty tend to proceed under provincial quasi-
criminal anti-cruelty statutes.80 Even with respect to proceedings 
brought under these provincial statutes, however, the Pacific Meat 
protection of common industry practice (sometimes referred to as the 
“implicit farming exemption”81) has continued to operate.  In many 
cases, such exemptions are reflected in the text of provincial anti-
cruelty statutes.82  For example, the Ontario Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act establishes that “[n]o person 
shall cause an animal to be in distress,” but then goes on to specify 
that this prohibition does not apply to “an activity carried out in 
accordance with reasonable and generally accepted practices of 
agricultural animal care, management or husbandry.”83  Similar 
exemptions for common agricultural practices exist in Alberta,84 
 
79 See Maneesha Deckha, Initiating a Non-Anthropocentric Jurisprudence: The 
Rule of Law and Animal Vulnerability under a Property Paradigm, 50 ALBERTA L. 
REV. 783, 806 n. 152 (2013); Sykes, supra note 26, at 34–35, 40–41 n.36, 49 
(explaining that the Criminal Code provision is “almost invariably” applied in 
cases where “pet dogs and cats” are victims of “acts of pointless sadism or spite,” 
with the exceptional application of the provision to farmed animals occurring only 
in respect of farms that have “stopped functioning as a farm” due to financial ruin); 
BISGOULD, supra note 69, at 74 (reporting that the “criminal law has not generally 
been invoked in the context of the actual practices by which animals are used,” 
including in agriculture, and that “much deference is given to those in industry to 
know best how to handle their animal property”); Gaillard & Sankoff, supra note 
66, at 318 (discussing the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal charges 
against agricultural operations). 
80 Gaillard & Sankoff, supra note 66, at 318–319 (explaining that “public 
prosecutors have shown an unwillingness” to lay charges under federal criminal 
anti-cruelty laws, preferring to proceed under provincial quasi-criminal offences 
“even in cases of extreme mistreatment”); Peter Sankoff, Canada’s Experiment 
with Industry Self-Regulation in Agriculture: Radical Innovation or Means of 
Insulation, 5 CANADIAN J. COMPARATIVE & CONTEMPORARY L. 1, 10 n.19 (2019) 
(observing that, following an undercover investigation of a dairy in Chilliwack, 
British Columbia, “[n]othwithstanding what seemed like a clear case of criminal 
level abuse, the workers were only charged and convicted of provincial offences”). 
81 Sykes, supra note 26, at 33. 
82 See Hughes and Meyer, supra note 26, at 63. 
83 Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c 
O.36, §§ 11.2(1), 11.2(6)(c). In theory, the term “reasonable” could be interpreted 
to carry a meaning independent of “generally accepted,” but in practice courts have 
construed these terms together as providing a blanket exemption for common 
agricultural practices.  See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 13–14. 
84 Animal Protection Act, R.S.A. 2000, c A-41, §§ 2(1)(1.1), 2(1)(2) (providing 
that “[n]o person shall cause an animal to be in distress,” then specifying that 
“[t]his section does not apply if the distress results from an activity carried on in 
accordance with. . . reasonable and generally accepted practices of animal care, 
management, husbandry . . . or slaughter”). 
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British Columbia,85 Nova Scotia,86 and Quebec.87  Consequently, the 
aggregate choices of individual producers become part of the law—
defining through common use which practices are immune from 
prosecution regardless of how harmful they may be to animals. 
In the United States, a similar picture emerges: general anti-
cruelty statutes have been drafted or construed to exempt common 
agricultural practices.  As a result, the collective private choices of 
individual producers effectively become legal standards.  In their 
critique of farmed animal protection in the United States, David 
Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan describe this dynamic as it arose in 
the case of Commonwealth v. Barnes:88 
In Pennsylvania, individuals accused of starving 
horses argued that the practice of denying nutrition 
to horses who were no longer wanted and were to be 
sold for meat was a “normal agricultural operation” 
. . . .  Such horses, the defendants argued, are 
commonly denied veterinary care and sufficient 
nutrition, and are placed in so-called killer pens  
. . . .  While the court did convict the defendants of 
cruelty, it decided to do so only because the 
defendants failed to offer sufficient testimony as to 
the pervasiveness of the practice, and no testimony 
[that they were in fact raising the horses for meat].  
The case highlights the ramifications of the 
exclusion of customary farming practices from 
criminal anticruelty statutes . . . .  The defendants’ 
 
85 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 372, § 24.02(c) 
(providing that “[a] person must not be convicted of an offence under this Act in 
relation to an animal in distress if . . . the distress results from an activity that is 
carried out in accordance with reasonable and generally accepted practices of 
animal management . . . .”).  Note that British Columbia has additionally 
incorporated the NFACC Codes into its legislative scheme.  See Animal Care 
Codes of Practice Regulation, B.C. Reg. 34/2019, § 4; see also infra note 142 and 
accompanying text. 
86 Animal Protection Act, S.N.S. 2008, c 33, §§ 21(1), 21(4) (establishing that 
“[n]o person shall cause an animal to be in distress,” then specifying that this 
prohibition does not apply “if the distress, pain suffering or injury results from an 
activity carried on . . . in accordance with reasonable and generally accepted 
practices of animal management, husbandry or slaughter”). 
87 Animal Welfare and Safety Act, C.Q.L.R., c B-3.1, §§ 6, 7 (establishing that “[a] 
person may not, by an act or omission, cause an animal to be in distress,” then 
stating that this prohibition does not apply in respect of “agricultural activities . . . 
carried on in accordance with generally recognized rules”).   
88 629 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
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problem was not that they starved horses, but that 
they could not prove that enough people were doing 
the same thing.89  
Since the time of Wolfson and Sullivan’s writing, the practice of 
codifying explicit customary agricultural practice exemptions has 
only expanded in the United States.90  As a result, primary legislation, 
despite its formal anchoring in public law, places significant 
authority to set legal standards in the hands of private actors. 
B.  Regulation and Delegated Legislation 
Regulations, or “delegated legislation,” represent another 
public law tool governing the lives of farmed animals.  Regulations 
arise where primary legislation has expressly delegated to an agency 
or public body the authority to set precise regulatory standards.  The 
formal role of public law standards and values remains relatively 
clear in cases of regulation or delegated legislation.  Under such 
arrangements, public bodies are bound by enabling legislation, which 
is in turn passed through democratic means.  Although the shape and 
content of public engagement respecting rule-making and standard-
setting differs significantly between Canada and the United States, 
both jurisdictions include some basic procedural requirements that 
are followed in the creation of regulations, and some minimal 
opportunities for judicial and appellate review through which 
citizens might hold public actors accountable to their statutory grants 
of authority.91 
As is the case with primary legislation in both Canada and 
the United States, regulatory prohibitions respecting specific farmed 
animal use practices are extremely rare.  In Canada, provincial 
farmed animal protection regulations are either highly general in 
form or explicitly import standards set by non-governmental entities 
 
89 Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 214–215. 
90 See JUSTIN MARCEAU, BEYOND CAGES: ANIMAL LAW AND CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT 98–110 (2019) (surveying common agricultural practice exemptions 
in the United States and explaining that, “[i]f a practice becomes generally 
accepted or customary, no matter how cruel, it cannot, as a matter of law, serve as 
the basis for an animal cruelty prosecution in forty states”). 
91 For a discussion of regulatory oversight in Canada, see Linda Reid, Oversight of 
Regulations by Parliamentarians, 33 CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY REV. 7, 7–10 
(2010); Lorne Neudorf, Rule by Regulation: Revitalizing Parliament’s Supervisory 
Role in the Making of Subordinate Legislation, 39 CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY 
REV. 29, 29–31 (2016).  For a discussion of ‘rulemaking’ in U.S. administrative 
law, including a discussion of differences from select parliamentary systems, see 
PETER CANE, CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE POWER: AN HISTORICAL COMPARISON 
ch. 8 (2016). 
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(as discussed in the following subsection).  In the United States, 
however, a small minority of states have delegated law-making 
authority to a public body which has in turn established detailed 
regulations respecting specific agricultural practices.92  These rare 
instances of detailed regulatory protection of animal interests 
arguably represent the strongest importation of enforceable public 
law values into farmed animal protection regimes in Canada and the 
United States.   
New Jersey’s experience with detailed regulation of farmed 
animal protection provides a useful example.  In 1996, the New 
Jersey Legislature amended its anti-cruelty statute to delegate 
standard-setting authority to the New Jersey Department of 
Agriculture (NJDA) and the state Board of Agriculture.93 In 
particular, the amended statute prohibited “cruelty” toward animals 
while also enabling the NJDA and Board of Agriculture to establish 
“safe harbor” provisions that would insulate certain practices from 
legal action under the statute and its regulations.94  In that context, 
the NJDA attempted to create, inter alia, a broad “safe harbor” 
exemption for common agricultural practices and a narrower “safe 
harbor” for tail docking.95  Because the NJDA was bound by a 
substantive statutory mandate, to which it was accountable as a 
matter of public law, the regulatory process and resulting standards 
reflected public law values. 
Consider the impact of public law values on the common 
agricultural practices “safe harbor.”96  First, a relatively transparent 
 
92 See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 3, 5, 6, 14 (discussing 
delegated authority to set binding standards for the protection of farmed animals in 
New Jersey, Alaska, Arizona and Ohio).  
93 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-16.1(a) (1996) (“The State Board of Agriculture and the 
Department of Agriculture, in consultation with the New Jersey Agricultural 
Experiment Station and within six months of the date of enactment of this act, shall 
develop and adopt, pursuant to the ‘Administrative Procedure Act,’ P.L.1968, 
c.410 (C. 52:14B-1 et seq.): (1) standards for the humane raising, keeping, care, 
treatment, marketing, and sale of domestic livestock; and (2) rules and regulations 
governing the enforcement of those standards.”). 
94 N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep’t of Agric., 955 
A.2d 886, 900 (N.J. 2008); see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-16.1(b) (1996) 
(“[T]here shall exist a presumption that the raising, keeping, care, treatment, 
marketing, and sale of domestic livestock in accordance with the standards 
developed and adopted therefor pursuant to subsection a. of this section shall not 
constitute a violation of any provision of this title involving alleged cruelty to, or 
inhumane care or treatment of, domestic livestock.”).   
95 See N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep’t of Agric., 955 
A.2d 886, 903–909 (N.J. 2008). 
96 Id. 
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and accountable process was followed in the development and 
adoption of regulatory standards. Second, the standards themselves 
were subject to judicial review, creating a further layer of 
accountability and transparency, and introducing the courts as 
relatively impartial adjudicators.  Third, the courts’ ultimate decision 
respecting the safe harbor constrained the role of private producers, 
in part out of concern that producers’ economic incentives made 
them ill-suited to impartial standard-setting respecting animal care.   
First, the process by which regulatory standards were 
adopted was relatively transparent and accountable, resulting in a 
final regulation that was somewhat more protective of animal 
interests.  The regulations as originally proposed had defined 
exempted “routine husbandry practices” broadly, as “techniques 
commonly employed and accepted as necessary or beneficial to raise, 
keep, care, treat, market, and transport livestock.”97  This would have 
had the effect of conferring substantive standard-setting authority on 
producers, essentially re-inscribing the common agricultural practice 
exemption found in the anti-cruelty provisions discussed in the 
previous subsection.  In accordance with the New Jersey 
Administrative Procedures Act, however, this initial proposal was 
subject to a public comment period, in which over 6,500 written 
comments were received and various witnesses appeared at a public 
hearing.98  Following extensive criticism of the proposed definition 
of “routine husbandry practices” as both vague and inclusive of 
inhumane practices,99 the definition of “routine husbandry practices” 
was redefined in the promulgated regulation as “techniques 
commonly taught by veterinary schools, land grant colleges, and 
agricultural extension agents.”100  This public process therefore 
resulted in a regulatory definition of prohibited conduct that was a 
degree removed from a direct conferral of authority on the collective 
choices of individual producers.  The process itself, moreover, was 
relatively transparent and accountable to the public. 
Second, the standards adopted by the regulators were subject 
to judicial review, further demonstrating and bolstering the presence 
of public law values in the New Jersey scheme.  The conferral of 
authority on “veterinary schools, land grant colleges, and agricultural 
extension agents” to define acceptable “routine husbandry 
practices,” although narrower than the initially proposed definition, 
 
97 35 N.J. Reg. 1877 (May 5, 2003). 
98 36 N.J. Reg. 2586(a) (June 7, 2004).  
99 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 905. 
100 Id. at 904.  
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was nonetheless challenged in judicial review proceedings.101 The 
petitioners, including several animal advocacy groups, argued that 
the safe harbor provisions for routine husbandry practices 
impermissibly delegated authority to private parties (in particular, 
veterinary schools, land grant colleges and agricultural extension 
agents), despite the legislative mandate that the NJDA and Board of 
Agriculture were to determine the content of the “humane” practices 
that would be authorized by the regulations.102  In arguing that the 
regulations impermissibly delegated standard-setting authority to 
these private parties, the petitioners noted that there was no evidence 
that the NJDA scrutinized these entities, individually or as a whole, 
for example through independent assessment of their texts, curricula, 
course offerings or personnel.103  The NJDA, it was argued, thus had 
no evidentiary basis for assuming that the practices taught by these 
entities were “humane,” as required by the enabling legislation, and 
in accordance with the NJDA’s own regulatory definition of 
“humane” as “marked by compassion, sympathy, and consideration 
for the welfare of animals.”104 
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed.105  The court 
described the regulations as “plac[ing] into the hands of this wide-
ranging and ill-defined group of presumed experts the power to 
determine what is humane.”106  The agency’s failure to conduct any 
substantive inquiry into the practices endorsed by these entities left 
the NJDA “without any basis in the record” for their apparent 
 
101 Id. at 903–904.  The legal challenge took the form of an “appeal” to the 
Appellate Division. Id. at 888. Appeals to the Appellate division may be made as 
of right “to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or 
officer, and to review the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or 
officer” with specified exceptions, none of which applied in this case.  See N.J. CT. 
R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  An earlier appeal, launched prior to the promulgation of the 
amended regulations, had been dismissed without prejudice to allow the parties to 
pursue the matter after the regulations had been promulgated.  See Soc’y for 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 917 n.6. 
102 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 904. 
103 Id. at 904–05.  The NJDA countered that it had in fact reviewed some such 
curricular materials, though the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that this 
review did not take place until after the regulations had been promulgated and 
litigation was underway. Id. at 905–06. 
104 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2:8-1.2(a) (2004); see Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals, 955 A.2d at 904. 
105 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 904–07.  The 
petitioners were initially unsuccessful before the New Jersey Appellate Division.  
N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., No. A-
6319-03T1, 2007 WL 486764, at *20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 16, 2007). 
106 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 905. 
 
182               JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY               [Vol.16 
 
presumption that the practices endorsed by these entities were in fact 
humane.107   
The New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized two distinct but 
interrelated flaws in the routine practices safe harbor exemptions: 
first, that they failed to follow the legislature’s directive that the 
agency authorize only “humane” practices; and, second, that they 
amounted to an impermissible delegation of statutory authority.108  
The court observed that many other jurisdictions have adopted 
welfare laws that exempt routine agricultural practices,109 and that 
the New Jersey legislature explicitly chose a different “specific 
goal,” namely to exempt “humane,” rather than merely “routine” 
practices.110  In the court’s view, “[t]o suggest, as the Department's 
‘routine husbandry practices’ definition implies, that the Legislature 
meant ‘routine’ when it said ‘humane’ would ‘abuse the interpretive 
process and . . . frustrate the announced will of the people.’”111  In 
other words, the public law value of accountability was engaged and, 
because of the regulatory structure in place, enforceable through 
judicial review. 
Third, the public law value of impartiality was relevant to 
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s assessment.  The court was 
particularly troubled by the fact that the “impermissible 
subdelegation” in this instance transferred power to “some entities 
that might also be described as private interests.”112  Dr. Bernard E. 
Rollin, an expert in animal welfare, had filed an amicus brief with 
the court explaining that the private entities in question in fact 
endorsed practices on the basis of their economic productivity, rather 
than on the basis of compassion or concern for animal well-being.113  
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that “there is no evidence 
that [the NJDA] considered the intersection between the interests of 
those who attended these institutions or are taught by them and those 
 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 906–07.   
109 Id.; see, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(c)(3) (repealed 2015); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 18-9-201.5(1).  For an overview of customary agricultural practice 
exemptions in the United States, see Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 212–16. 
110 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 906. 
111 Id. (quoting Serv. Armament Co. v. Hyland, 362 A.2d 13, 17 (N.J. 1976)). 
112 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 906. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court relied on the established principle that agencies may not 
subdelegate their statutory powers unless the legislature intends that they may do 
so.  Id.  The court also relied on caselaw demonstrating particular skepticism of 
unauthorized subdelegations to interested parties.  Id.  
113 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 896–97, 904. 
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who are concerned with the welfare of animals.”114  The court 
remarked that it would have been possible for the NJDA to 
incorporate external standards through more deliberate reference to 
specific institutions that the agency determined to be reliable arbiters 
of “humane” treatment.115  As it stood though, the agency “accepted, 
without analysis, the practices that are taught in every veterinary 
school, land grant college, and agricultural extension agent not only 
in this state, but in the rest of the country and, it would appear, 
wherever they might be found around the globe . . . [although] 
nothing in the record suggests that all of them will meet the standard 
set by our Legislature.”116   
In light of this broad, unauthorized, and unaccountable 
delegation of authority, the court struck down the safe harbor 
exemptions for routine husbandry practices as representing 
“arbitrary and capricious” agency action.117  Following this ruling, 
the agency passed a revised regulation, prescribing an open list of 
specific “science-based” sources and standards, which “may be 
found to be humane.”118  By specifically identifying particular 
“science-based” sources, the agency narrowed its reliance on private 
parties as arbiters of “humane” conduct, and assigned this role to 
actors defined by their supposed impartiality.119  Moreover, these 
actors’ assessments of “humane” practices no longer gave rise to 
definite “safe harbors,” but were instead merely persuasive (i.e. “may 
 
114 Id. at 906. 
115 Id. at 906–07. 
116 Id. at 907. 
117 Id. 
118 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2:8-1.1(b) (2012) (establishing a presumption that “the 
raising, keeping, care, treatment, marketing and sale of domestic livestock” does 
not constitute “cruelty” or “inhumane care” where it includes practices that “may 
be found to be humane, based upon techniques for necessary livestock 
management and producers included in the following science-based sources or 
other sources, which may be shown to incorporate similar science-based 
standards,” including the Handbook of Livestock Management, (Battaglia, 4th ed., 
2007), and particular publications of the Federation of Animal Science Societies, 
the American Veterinary Medical Association, the American Association of 
Equine Practitioners, the Rutgers School of Environmental and Biological 
Sciences, and the New Jersey Agricultural Experiment Station. 
119 The presumed independence and impartiality of “science-based” sources is 
contested.  See generally SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995) (arguing that scientific and legal knowledge 
are interconnected and co-constituting).  Nonetheless, this appeal to “science” 
undeniably represents an embrace of impartiality as a public law value, particularly 
in comparison to the prior scheme’s delegation of authority to parties with more 
direct financial self-interest in lax regulatory standards.  See supra notes 112–113 
and accompanying text. 
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be found to be humane”); the ultimate decision as to whether a 
practice qualified as “humane” was now more clearly in the hands of 
public authorities. 
In addition to challenging the NJDA’s routine agricultural 
practice exemption, the petitioners also challenged a number of more 
particular safe harbor exemptions, including the “tail docking” of 
dairy cows.120  The petitioners argued that the practice of tail docking 
was not “humane” as required by the governing statute, and so its 
inclusion within a safe harbor was beyond the scope of the 
regulator’s authority.121  The NJDA defended its decision on the basis 
that it had responded appropriately to concerns about animal pain 
raised in public comment and that there was some (albeit conflicting) 
evidence to support the view that tail docking might improve milk 
quality and udder health and reduce the spread of disease.122  The 
NJDA further noted that it does in fact “discourage[]” tail docking, 
and intends to monitor the practice with the possibility of banning it 
in the future if it later concludes the practice to be “inhumane.”123  
The NJDA was thus required in the course of judicial review 
proceedings to account for both its decision-making process and its 
ultimate choice as a regulator.  Such transparency and accountability 
exceed that required of producers empowered to set standards 
through the common agricultural practice exemptions to anti-cruelty 
legislation, as discussed in the previous subsection.   
Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the 
NJDA’s arguments.  The reviewing court recognized the 
“considerable expertise that the [NJDA] brought to bear in reaching 
its decision to include tail docking within its list of permitted 
practices,” and the very high standard of review that applies to 
agency decisions of this kind.124  Nonetheless, the court concluded 
that the decision to list routine tail docking as a permissible (i.e. 
“humane”) practice was “both arbitrary and capricious,” and so 
outside the scope of the regulator’s authority.125  The court was 
swayed not only by the evidence of the pain and suffering caused by 
the practice, but also by the fact that both the American Veterinary 
Medical Association and the Canadian Veterinary Medical 
Association  have “specifically disparaged” the practice “as having 
 
120 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 908. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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no benefit and as leading to distress.”126  The ambiguity of the 
evidence of any benefit associated with routine tail docking, and the 
fact that the practice was “discourage[d]” by the NJDA, supported 
the court’s finding that shielding tail docking from penalty was 
contrary to the statutory mandate.127  The statutory directive that the 
agency must define “humane” practices required that decisions 
respecting tail docking not be left to the “individual conscience of 
each dairy farmer.”128  Further to this judicial ruling, the governing 
regulation was modified to provide that tail docking of cattle be 
permitted only in individual cases (i.e. not as a routine matter), and 
“only upon determination by a veterinarian for individual 
animals.”129  Again, we see that the regulator was required to be 
transparent about its reasons for setting particular standards, and was 
accountable to an impartial judiciary.  This public law oversight, 
moreover, substantively elevated the governing standards for the care 
of dairy cattle.  
New Jersey’s experience of regulation and review is highly 
unusual in the context of farmed animal protection in Canada and the 
United States, representing a relatively remarkable level of 
protection for public law values.   It is not my intention to suggest 
that dairy cows in New Jersey have good lives, or that the legal 
regime governing producers in that state is acceptable.  It is important 
to emphasize that dairy industries across Canadian and U.S. 
jurisdictions are characterized by extensive social and physical 
control of animals.130  The NJDA and reviewing court were each 
engaged in welfare balancing wherein considerable attention was 
given to whether impugned practices were in fact useful to dairy 
production.131  Tail docking was ultimately impermissible as a 
routine practice because there was no persuasive evidence that it 
benefited dairying.132  Harmful practices that are perceived as 
necessary to industrial dairying—most notably calf separation—are 
not disrupted or even threatened by the New Jersey scheme.133  While 





129 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2:8-2.6(f) (2012); see ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra 
note 64, at 3. 
130 See supra Part II. 
131 See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
132 See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
133 For a discussion of calf separation, see supra notes 19–20 and accompanying 
text. 
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protection, they are certainly not sufficient, especially absent 
substantial democratic commitment to animal interests.134   
Nonetheless, the presence of public law values—
impartiality, transparency and accountability—are remarkable in this 
scheme relative to other forms of farmed animal protection across 
Canada and the United States.  Concerned citizens in New Jersey 
believed that a regulatory body was failing to adhere to its statutory 
mandate in defining “humane” practices.  These citizens were able 
to file suit, bring evidence, and convince a reviewing court that it was 
“arbitrary and capricious” to conclude that routine tail docking was 
“humane,” and that it was similarly “arbitrary and capricious” to 
assume that the practices endorsed by “veterinary schools, land grant 
colleges, and agricultural extension agents” ought to be trusted as 
necessarily “humane.”135 The litigation and ensuing judicial reasons 
engaged with themes of bias, transparency, adequacy of reasons, and 
substantive conformity with legal requirements.  In short, the 
governing regime was legible as an operation of public power, and, 
as such, public law values were understood by all involved to be both 
relevant and operative.   
C.  Private or Quasi-Private Standards 
Canada’s National Farm Animal Care Council (NFACC) 
represents a step further along the rough public-to-private spectrum 
of farmed animal protection tools: formal but private (or quasi-
private) standard-setting bodies.  Such bodies may be recognized 
through statute, regulation or judicial assessment as setting 
persuasive or authoritative standards for animal care.  But these 
bodies themselves are not legally bound to public law values.  As the 
NFACC case study demonstrates, such entities may choose to adopt 
processes that have elements of transparency, accountability or 
impartiality, but these choices are not subject to public law 
enforcement. 
NFACC is wholly funded by government, but not created or 
constrained by statute or regulations.136  NFACC is comprised of 
 
134 See infra Part V.  See also Eisen, supra note 49 (arguing that democratic 
engagement is necessary to enforcing and strengthening animal protection 
standards). 
135 See Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 903–07.  
136 See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 17 (“From the start, the endeavour has been 
funded by Agriculture Canada, a federal agency, though the government has no 
voting seat at the table, and no official role in the direction of the coalition.  It 
funds the project and has observer status – nothing more.  Other provincial 
 
2020]               PRIVATE FARMS, PUBLIC POWER                  187 
 
commodity producers (including Dairy Farmers of Canada, Dairy 
Processors Association of Canada, and Dairy Farmers of Ontario), 
animal protection groups, the Canadian Veterinary Medical 
Association, and other interested parties, including restaurants and 
retailers, and manufacturers of animal feed.137  The primary function 
of NFACC is the development of “Codes of Practice” (Codes) setting 
out guidelines for the care of farmed animals.138  
Although NFACC Codes use some language suggestive of 
legal compulsion (i.e. “standards” and “requirements”),139 the Codes 
have no independent legal force.140  Their juridical role varies from 
province to province depending on the extent, if any, of legislative 
incorporation.  In some provinces, where no legislative or regulatory 
reference is made to the Codes, they may be relied upon by courts as 
evidence of the “reasonable and generally accepted” practices that 
are routinely exempted from the ordinary operation of anti-cruelty 
statutes.141  In other provinces, the Codes are referentially 
incorporated to provide “safe harbors,” such that compliance with the 
Codes constitutes an absolute defense to a cruelty prosecution.142  
The Codes are not generally incorporated as establishing mandatory 
regulatory standards, although such incorporation is certainly 
possible.143 
 
agriculture ministries have also been involved, though government agencies are 
not permitted to vote on NFACC matters.”). 
137 Id. at 16–17. 
138 See id. at 18. 
139 Id. at 18, 32–33, 48–49; see also Implementing Codes of Practice, NFACC.CA 
(2013), http://www.nfacc.ca/resources/assessment/ 
animal_care_assessment_framework.pdf. 
140 Sankoff, supra note 80, at 18–19. 
141 See Sankoff, supra note 84, at 35, 37 n.122 (discussing R. v. Dondale, 2017 
SKPC 58 as a case in which “failing to follow the code of practice, in conjunction 
with other evidence, established that the animals were in distress for the purposes 
of the Act”); id. at 35 n.118 (discussing R. v. Kowalik, 2010 SKPC 58 and R. v. 
Tomalin, 2011 NBPC 29 as cases that demonstrate that courts are strongly 
influenced by NFACC Codes). But see id. at 35 n.118 (discussing R. v. Van 
Dongen, 2004 BCPC 479 and R. v. Hurley, 2017 ONCJ 263 as emphasizing 
NFACC compliance is neither mandatory nor determinative of compliance with 
the law). 
142 See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 19; see, e.g., Animal Care Codes of Practice 
Regulation, B.C. Reg. 34/2019, § 4 (establishing that “the requirements and 
recommendations contained in a [listed] code of practice [including the 2009 
NFACC Code of Practice for the Care and Handling of Dairy Cattle] are 
recognized as reasonable and generally accepted” for the purposes of the statutory 
customary agricultural practices exemption). 
143 See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 20.  For examples of mandatory incorporation of 
Codes, see Animal Protection Standards Regulations, Nfld. Reg. 36/12, §§ 2(2) & 
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The NFACC “Code development process” sets out a number 
of procedural and substantive requirements for Codes.144  These 
include, for example, that Codes “should meet or exceed [World 
Organisation for Animal Health] standards,” should be based on “the 
best available science and other acceptable knowledge sources,” and, 
wherever possible, should include reasons for standards imposed.145  
The Code process is initiated by commodity groups themselves, for 
example the Dairy Farmers of Canada.146  An expert scientific report 
is first prepared, setting out major animal welfare concerns in a given 
industry.147  A draft Code is then developed by a Code Committee 
with a specified composition, and made available for a 60-day public 
consultation period.148  If that process is “appropriately followed,” 
the NFACC Executive “will support the Code,” and a final Code will 
be issued.149  There is, however, no mechanism by which to hold the 
NFACC process accountable to these requirements, through judicial 
review or otherwise.150 
NFACC’s treatment of calf separation and tail docking 
demonstrate the limits of this regulatory model.  First, the Code’s 
approach to tail docking illustrates the weakness of Code 
“requirements.”  Second, the Code’s approach to calf separation 
demonstrates the strength of producer interests in defining Codes that 
 
5 (establishing that a “code or standard adopted in these regulations may be 
considered a requirement” where the code contains mandatory language, and 
“adopt[ing]” aspects of the NFACC Code of Practice for the Care and Handling of 
Dairy Cattle); Animal Welfare Regulations, P.E.I. Reg. EC194/17, § 26, sched. B 
(requiring out that “[e]very owner of a commercial animal shall comply with the 
codes of practice listed in Schedule B,” including the Code of Practice for the 
Care and Handling of Dairy Cattle). NFACC specifies that Code requirements 
“may be enforceable under federal and provincial legislation” and that producers 
“may be compelled by industry associations to undertake corrective measures or 
risk a loss of market options.” Codes of Practice for the Care and Handling of 
Farm Animals, NFACC.CA (2020), https://www.nfacc.ca/code-development-
process.  Such possible incorporation into legislative or voluntary standards are, 
however, not intrinsic to the Codes themselves.  See Sankoff, supra note 84, at 23. 
144 Development Process for Codes of Practice for the Care and Handling of Farm 
Animals, NFACC.CA (2020), https://www.nfacc.ca/code-development-process 
[hereinafter Development Process for Codes]; see also Sankoff, supra note 80, at 
22–23. 
145 Development Process for Codes, supra note 144. 
146 Id. 
147 Id.   
148 Id.   
149 Id. 
150 See Sankoff, supra note 80 at 4–5 (observing that NFACC is “a major player on 
the Canadian law-making scene” despite “an organizational framework that lacks 
many of the traditional checks and balances of a legislative body, and the fact that 
what the group produces is not actually law, in the strict sense of the word”). 
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prioritize industry imperatives over animal well-being—and the 
absence of protection for public law values in spite of this predictable 
outcome. 
The Dairy Code of Practice (2009) takes preambular note of 
the lack of evidence supporting tail docking as a hygiene measure, 
and the research demonstrating that “[d]ocked heifers show signs of 
chronic pain,” among other possible complications.151  The Code sets 
out as a “requirement” that “[d]airy cattle must not be tail docked 
unless medically necessary,”152 and sets out a number of alternative 
“recommended best practices,” including “switch trimming” (i.e. 
trimming the hair on cows’ tails) and maintenance of a clean housing 
environment.153  As noted above, however, the language of 
“requirement” should not be taken to define a mandatory legal 
standard in the absence of formal incorporation into a provincial 
regulation.154  The Code’s use of the word “requirement” carries no 
independent legal force.155 
The Dairy Code of Practice further acknowledges calf 
separation as a source of “stress,” but does not provide for any 
“requirements” in relation to this practice.156  The Code’s preambular 
statement on “Calves” explains: 
Generally, dairy calves are separated from their 
mothers shortly after birth. There are benefits to both 
calf and dam by allowing the pair to bond. Allowing 
the calf to spend a longer period of time with the 
dam may result in lowered morbidity and mortality 
in the calf; however, separation stress to both the 
cow and calf will be higher the longer they are 
together. Cow health is generally improved by 
allowing the calf to suckle (related to oxytocin 
effects on the post partum uterus). Whether the calf 
is removed immediately or allowed to suckle the 
cow, it is important to ensure that the calf receives 
adequate colostrum.157  
 
151 Code of Practice for the Handling of Dairy Cattle, NFACC.CA § 4.6 (2009), 
https://www.nfacc.ca/codes-of-practice/dairy-cattle/code#Section4 [hereinafter 
Dairy Code of Practice]. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text. 
155 See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text. 
156 Dairy Code of Practice, supra note 151, at § 3.8. 
157 Id. (citations omitted). 
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The “recommended” practices that follow include monitoring the 
calf for signs of illness during its early days, and the recommendation 
that farmers “reduce separation distress by either removing the calf 
shortly after birth or by using a two-step weaning process.”158   
The notional (but not generally legal) force that “required” 
practices may have do not apply to such recommended practices.159  
In fact two-step weaning processes remain rare, with most dairy 
calves separated immediately from their mothers despite the 
associated “stress.”160  The sole social “requirement” set out for 
calves is that they “have visual contact with other calves.”161  It is 
further recommended that their “motivation to suck” be satisfied with 
an artificial teat.162  The acknowledged scientific consensus on the 
stress of separation, and the lack of associated “requirements” (even 
in the diminished form represented by the Code), reflects the interests 
of producers and production imperatives in the Code process.   
However, unlike under the New Jersey regime, the NFACC 
delegation of authority to producers is not legible as a public law 
concern amenable to judicial oversight.  NFACC, although funded 
entirely by government, and created for the purpose of setting 
standards contemplated to have legal effect, thus represents a step 
away from the public law values evident in the New Jersey scheme.  
Because NFACC does not operate pursuant to statutory authority, it 
cannot be made accountable as the NJDA was in respect of its 
decision to allow routine tail docking.  Arguments that NFACC is 
biased, lacks transparency, or makes unreasonable decisions are not 
cognizable as justiciable questions of public law.  Formally, NFACC 
is merely a private body, making private choices, unaccountable to 
the mechanisms that constrain public power.  This is true despite the 
fact that NFACC is created to, and does in fact, generate Canada’s 
only detailed articulation of standards for legally permissible 
treatment of farmed animals.163 
There is no legal basis on which to demand adherence to 
public law values—such as transparency, accountability and 
impartiality—in NFACC standard-setting.  These values do, 
 
158 Id. 
159 See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text. 
160 Emillie M. Bassi, Ellen Goddard & John R. Parkins, “That’s the Way We’ve 
Always Done It”: A Social Practice Analysis of Farm Animal Welfare in Alberta, 
32 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 335, 346–47 (2019). 
161 Dairy Code of Practice, supra note 151, at § 1.1.1. 
162 See id. at § 2.2.1. 
163 Sankoff, supra note 80, at 4–5. 
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however, arguably remain operative in an attenuated form.  Because 
NFACC is designed to have many of the trappings of a conventional 
administrative body, NFACC offers some assurances of 
transparency, structured decision-making, and reason-giving—albeit 
assurances that are not subject to judicial or administrative 
supervision.  NFACC, for example, promises to follow a specific 
process for developing its Codes,164 binds itself to consider some 
kinds of evidence,165 includes requirements for the composition of 
Code Committees,166 commits to the regular review of Codes,167 and 
publishes draft Codes for comment before ultimately making its final 
Codes transparently available to the public.168  The fact that judicial 
review is unavailable, however, limits the confidence that might 
reasonably be placed in these voluntary processes and commitments. 
D.  Private Choices of Individual Actors 
In the absence of express legal requirements to the contrary 
(which, as we have seen, are rare), individual producers may decide 
to dock the tails of cattle on their farms, or separate calves from their 
mothers, or otherwise engage in common agricultural practices 
despite their harm to dairy animals.169  At first blush, these may 
appear to be purely private choices.  In legal terms, we might think 
of these as producers’ private decisions as to how to dispose of their 
own property.  But, as we have seen, even these purest of private 
actions carry a law-making function in the context of animal 
protection as it is structured in most jurisdictions.  This is because, 
as discussed above, almost every jurisdiction has incorporated 
“customary agricultural practices” as the governing legal standard 
for defining exemptions to criminal and quasi-criminal anti-cruelty 
laws—including in jurisdictions where those laws are the only ones 
governing the treatment of animals on farms.170  In most 
jurisdictions, therefore, dairy producers’ private, profit-seeking 
decisions carry a double valence for the lives of farmed animals.  
These private producer choices not only shape the experiences of the 
animals they own themselves, but they also contribute to setting the 
 
164 Development Process for Codes, supra note 144. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id.; see also Sankoff, supra note 80, at 28 (arguing that this establishment of 
periodic review enhances public deliberation on the legal treatment of farmed 
animals).  
168 Development Process for Codes, supra note 144. 
169 See supra Part II for a review of harmful dairy industry practices. 
170 See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 212–216; supra notes 64–90 and 
accompanying text. 
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legal standards that govern the treatment of farmed animals more 
generally.   
Because this form of standard-setting power is so diffuse and 
indirect, the force of public law values is negligible.  There is no 
expectation that individual dairy producers will be transparent with 
respect to how they treat their herds, let alone how they arrive at 
decisions respecting animal care.  In fact, across jurisdictions, the 
proliferation of “ag gag” laws affirmatively protect producers’ ability 
to shield their operations from public scrutiny.171  There is further no 
expectation that they will be impartial when making choices 
respecting animal care.  Producers are not bound, even notionally, to 
any public obligation to weigh competing values in setting standards 
for animal care.  They are, instead, legally authorized and expected 
to maximize their own interests in dairy productivity, with their 
resulting choices elevated to the level of de facto legal standards.  
Finally, with no public obligations to impartiality or transparency, 
there are no substantive commitments to which they might be made 
accountable, and no mechanism for public law accountability.  
E.  Dairy Cow Protection and Public Law Values  
The foregoing survey elaborates the various forms of legal 
oversight engaged by Canadian and U.S. jurisdictions to protect the 
interests of dairy cows.  Although organized around the formality of 
lawmaking authority involved (beginning with legislation and 
ending in practice or custom), this survey has demonstrated that, in 
reality, there are significant interactions and overlaps between these 
forms of governance.  These regulatory environments represent, in 
Jody Freeman’s terms, case studies of “regulatory regimes,” in which 
the classical administrative law distinction between “public” and 
“private” seems to blur, with private actors directly or indirectly 
engaged in public or quasi-public functions.172  In particular, we have 
seen that, across jurisdictions, the aggregate choices of individual 
agricultural producers have a significant impact on the substance of 
legal standards respecting the treatment of farmed animals. 
Scholars and animal advocates have long argued that this 
state of affairs gives farmers effectively unrestricted control over the 
 
171 See Jodi Lazare, Ag-Gag Laws, Animal Rights Activism, and the Constitution: 
What is Protected Speech? 58 ALBERTA L. REV. 83 (2020); Justin F. Marceau, Ag 
Gag Past, Present, and Future, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317 (2015). 
172 See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New 
Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 816–19 (2000). 
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lives of the animals in their care.173  Such criticisms often emphasize 
that, given producers’ incentives to prioritize economic efficiency 
over animal well-being, this amounts to putting the proverbial 
“foxes” in charge of the “henhouse.”174   
I suggest here that this fox-in-charge-of-the-henhouse 
problem is one instance of a broader set of concerns respecting 
farmed animal protection: that public law values are inadequately 
guarded in this context.  Deficits of public law values such as 
impartiality, transparency and accountability are particularly 
problematic where animals are an affected constituency.  Animal 
experience lacks even the most basic recognition as a matter of 
private law.175  And public law, which has so far been the sole forum 
for legal recognition of animal interests, is only capable of providing 
robust protection where animals’ particular vulnerabilities are taken 
into account.176  Animals—who do not vote or hold office or instruct 
counsel—are likely to have their interests protected only where 
interested human voters, litigators and activists have the information 
and legal tools necessary to assure that protection.  In other words, 
effective animal protection is possible only in settings where 
decision-making is relatively impartial, transparent and 
accountable.177  
 Yet despite the importance of public law values to effective 
animal protection, legal regulation of farmed animal use has not 
generally nourished these values.  Exceptionally, in New Jersey, a 
generalized regulatory reliance on the judgments of “veterinary 
schools, land grant colleges, and agricultural extension agents” was 
justiciable, and ultimately found to be an impermissible delegation 
of authority to define standards of animal care, in part because of 
these parties’ interest in the economic exploitation of animals.178  But 
this lack of impartiality was only visible as a legal “problem” because 
of the structure of the particular statutory regime, the United States’ 
more developed judicial constraints on rulemaking processes,179 and 
because of the legislature’s choice to bring animal protection out of 
 
173 See BISGOULD, supra note 69, at 173–74; Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 
226.  
174 Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 212-219. 
175 See supra Part III. 
176 See supra Part III. 
177 See supra Part III. 
178 See Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 903–07; supra Part 
IV.B. 
179 See sources cited supra note 91. 
 
194               JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY               [Vol.16 
 
the sphere of broad criminal or quasi-criminal prohibition,180 and into 
the realm of more detailed public regulation.181 
More commonly, standard-setting respecting the treatment 
and use of farmed animals is left in the hands of entities like 
NFACC,182 or even the aggregate choices of individual producers, 
who are not bound to public law values.183 Although the NFACC 
process is entirely publicly funded, governments play no substantive 
role in establishing Code standards.184  The Code development 
process includes many of the trappings of a regulatory process 
(procedural requirements, public comment periods, substantive 
parameters, etc.), but these ostensible requirements are not subject to 
oversight or enforcement through judicial review proceedings.185  
The resulting process is unlike a statutory delegation of legislative 
authority, for example to professional associations: there is no 
delegating statute constraining the exercise of rulemaking or 
standard-setting, and no judicial oversight, despite the fact that the 
NFACC process does, and is contemplated to, generate standards 
with legal force.186 
 
180 See supra Part IV.A.  For a broader critique of criminal and carceral approaches 
to animal protection, see generally MARCEAU, supra note 90. 
181 See supra Part IV.B.   
182 See supra Part IV.C. 
183 See supra Part IV.D. 
184 See supra Part IV.C. 
185 See supra Part IV.C.  Such unenforceable methods of implementing public law 
values in privatized regulatory regimes have been scrutinized in administrative law 
scholarship.  See, e.g., MICHAEL TAGGART, THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 2 (1997); Steven Bernstein, When is Non-State Global Governance Really 
Governance?, 1 UTAH L. REV. 91, 91, 93 (2010) (arguing that many forms of non-
state government do not function as “meaningful governance”); Francesca 
Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A New 
Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 860–61 
(2011); Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-
Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 146, 146–68 (Robert 
Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge eds., 2010); Freeman, supra note 177, at 
816–19; Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. 
& ADMIN. L. 291, 298–326 (2014); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1374 (2003) (assessing whether and how 
private delegations might remain constitutionally accountable in the absence of 
judicial oversight); Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation 
More than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 
ADMIN. SCI. QUARTERLY 361, 361 (2010) (describing conditions under which self-
regulation is more or less effective, and concluding that self-regulation cannot 
fully replace direct legal enforcement mechanisms). 
186 Sankoff, supra note 80, at 4–5, 24 n.82 (referring to NFACC as a “body 
performing a government function of setting standards”). 
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Even more starkly, the prevalence of common agricultural 
practice exemptions to cruelty provisions across Canada and the 
United States effectively endows producers themselves with the 
authority to set standards of animal care.187  It may be the case that 
these farmers are effectively defining the substance of farmed animal 
protection law, but they are not subject in this function to any 
structured public oversight whatsoever.  Unlike primary legislation, 
these choices are not made by elected representatives.  Unlike 
regulation, they are not legally bound to follow any substantive or 
procedural requirements. Unlike private or quasi-private standard-
setting, there is not even a voluntary or implied commitment to 
embrace any public purposes whatsoever—or to articulate and 
defend decisions made.188   
In sum, standard-setting in the sphere of farmed animal 
protection is often left in the hands of actors who are legally welcome 
and expected to act in their own self-interest, rather than in the 
interests of animals, or in accordance with any other public-regarding 
interests; who are not required to explain or even publicly reveal their 
choices in any systematic way; and who are not generally 
accountable to any statute or public body.  Under this common model 
of standard-setting in the farmed animal protection context, the 
operation of public law values—including transparency, 
accountability, and impartiality—dwindles and effectively 
disappears. 
V.  Conclusion 
Dairy cows are radically vulnerable beings.189  They are 
subject to routinized, large-scale and deeply intimate harms in every 
area of their lives.190  Their sex, birth, and nursing are, in particular, 
meticulously controlled as the engines of vast economic and political 
machines constructed and directed by human beings.191  Like other 
farmed animals, they are particularly vulnerable to the private 
authority that their legal owners exercise over their lives and bodies, 
and to public law institutions, which they have no direct power to 
shape.   
 
187 See supra Part IV.A. and Part IV.D. 
188 The sole minimal exception would appear to be that some farmers may choose, 
on an individual basis, to bring their practices into the judicial and public-law 
spotlight by testifying as to their own practices in order to assist in the defence of 
another farmer charged with cruelty for a similar practice. 
189 Eisen, supra note 41, at 941–42; see supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
190 See supra Part II. 
191 See supra Part II. 
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Meaningful legal protection of animal interests requires 
recognition of public law values.  Impartiality, transparency, and 
accountability facilitate public engagement on the part of democratic 
and litigation constituencies beyond those who have a direct financial 
interest in the unencumbered exploitation of animals.  Yet, as we 
have seen, significant regulatory and standard-setting authority 
across Canada and the United States has been effectively ceded to 
producers, with exemptions for common agricultural practices 
serving as only the most extreme (and most common) example.  
These privatized modes of standard-setting leave vanishingly little 
role for the public law values necessary to effective farmed animal 
protection. 
The choice across jurisdictions to establish some veneer of 
constraint on industry, while at the same time allowing industry to 
substantially determine governing standards, raises questions.  Why 
are farmed animals regulated in this way, despite the apparent 
importance of transparency, impartiality and accountability to 
effective protection?  One possibility is that governments and 
democratic majorities feel a moral imperative to protect animals, but 
this imperative is significantly tempered by an ambivalence as to the 
consequences of more interventionist regulation.  The price and 
availability of agricultural products, including perhaps especially 
dairy,192 is weighted heavily in the policy balance.  If, however, we 
wish to take seriously the experiences of the animals whose lives are 
so thoroughly determined by their positions as farmed animals, the 
public law dimensions of our commitments must be more 
consciously and more consistently defended. 
 
192 See Mathilde Cohen, Of Milk and the Constitution, 40 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 
115, 119–21 (2017). 
